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FOUNDATIONS AND THE PATMAN 
COMMITTEE REPORT 
J,ohn E. Riecker* 
"The object of our study is to determine whether legislation is needed in 
order to provide effective supervisory controls over tax-exempt foundations 
and protect the public."1 
W ITH the above words, written at the wintry beginning of 1963, Congressman Wright Patman of Texas launched the first in-
stallment of a report to the Select Committee on Small Business of 
the United States House of Representatives. The report, despite its 
blunt invective and frequent emotionalism, is very likely to have 
far-reaching practical, if not legal, consequences in the laws and 
ethics relating to tax-exempt foundations and charitable trusts. 
Congressman Patman had much to allege with respect to his Com-
mittee's accumulated evidence of foundation dominance of small 
corporate business, as well as foundation abuse of the sanctuary 
of income tax exemption. "Unquestionably, the economic life of 
our Nation has become so intertwined with foundations that unless 
something is done about it they will hold a dominant position in 
every phase of American life," the Report stated.2 It continued, 
"the multimillion-dollar foundations have replaced the trusts which 
were broken up during the Theodore Roosevelt administration.''3 
"Never before," the Report declared, "have the economic factors of 
the complex and rapidly expanding foundation business been put 
under the microscope of public scrutiny.''4 
Chairman Patman went on to recommend an immediate mora-
torium on the granting of tax-exempt privileges to foundations. In 
an omnibus indictment of some of the practices of the 534 founda-
tions investigated by the Committee, Congressman Patman charged 
that a concentration of economic power, coupled with laxness of 
Internal Revenue Service enforcement of certain United States 
Treasury regulations pertaining to foundations, had culminated in 
"possible exploitation of the people's respect and admiration for 
• Member of the Michigan Bar.-Ed. 
1. CHAIRMAN OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITIEE ON SMALL BustNESS, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 
TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR EcoNOMY 
at v (Comm. Print 1962) (hereinafter cited as REFoRT). All references to the INTERNAL 
REVENUE CooE shall mean the 1954 statute, unless otherwise stated. Relevant changes 
made by the Revenue Act of 1964 will be noted in the text or footnotes. 
2. REPORT at V. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Id. at vi. 
[95] 
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charitable acts and gifts."5 "How can the Treasury Department pos-
sibly justify continuing to wring heavy taxes out of the farmer, the 
worker, and the small businessman," the Report asks, "knowing that 
people of large means are building one foundation after another, 
and-for all the Treasury knows-for the purpose of decreasing 
their taxes, eliminating competition and small business, subsidizing 
antidemocratic propaganda, and otherwise working a hardship on 
the Nation?"6 Calling the posture of such tax-exempt organizations 
a "mess," Congressman Patman proceeded to assail American tax-
payers-the "stockholders" providing the subsidy for foundations-
for permitting to continue unchecked the existence of this new breed 
of monopolistic power groups. A second installment of the Patman 
Report, issued in October 1963, concluded that "it is evident that 
nonfeasance on the part of Treasury officials has fostered tax-free 
commercial activities, violations of law and Treasury regulations, 
and tax avoidance through the device of foundations."7 
One cannot dispute the Patman Report's emphasis on the tre-
mendous growth of tax-exempt foundations vis-a-vis the American 
economy in general. According to the Report, there were 45,124 
foundations at the end of 1960, up from 12,295 at the end of 1952.8 
The 534 foundations under study by the Committee (a group com-
posed of most, but not all, of the largest foundations) had assets of 
over ten billion dollars, gross receipts during the period 1951-1960 
of seven billion dollars, and aggregate gifts and grants during the same 
period of 3.5 billion dollars.9 One hundred eleven of the organiza-
tions studied each owned over ten per cent of the outstanding stock 
of various large and small domestic corporations, many owning in 
excess of seventy per cent of particular corporations; the whole group 
under scrutiny by the Committee received, during 1951-1960, over 
two billion dollars in dividends from securities and 1.5 billion dollars 
from gains on sale of assets.10 Expenses alone consumed over ten 
per cent of aggregate receipts.11 At the end of 1960, the Report states, 
the net worth of the 534 foundations was twenty-three per cent 
greater than the total capital funds of the nation's fifty largest com-
5. Id. at I. 
6. Id. at 2. 
7. CHAIRMAN OF HOUSE SELEcr COMMITIEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 
TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUsrs: THEIR IMPAcr ON OUR EcoNOMY 
at iii (Comm. Print 1963). 
8. REPORT at V. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid; see also id. at 4. 
11. Id. at 51. 
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mercial banks and twenty-six per cent greater than the invested 
capital of the fifty largest merchandising firms.12 Such figures give 
some credibility to the Committee's charges that foundations possess 
the power to compete with small business, with commercial banks 
and lending institutions, and even with proper state and federal 
government functions. One can almost feel a Sherman Act analogy 
arise from the Report. 
While startling in its content, the Patman Report's review of the 
activities of tax-exempt organizations in the 1950's and early 1960's 
is only the latest in a long series of inquiries into private charity 
which have dotted the historical landscape ever since the English 
Statute of Charitable Uses (1601).13 Indeed, just a decade or so ago, 
intensive congressional investigation of foundation activities led to 
the most drastic change in the applicable tax law in over three 
hundred years: the Revenue Act of 1950.14 Actually, the Patman Re-
port, as it has taken shape through its second installment (released late 
in 1963), is unusual in that, until now, it has been exclusively the 
report of a committee chairman to his committee members. No real 
public hearings were held until July 1964, and full Committee par-
ticipation presumably has been minimal. The Committee's subpoena 
power has been limited primarily to obtaining reports and data 
from some negligent, and occasionally recalcitrant, organizations. 
Moreover, it has already been claimed that the Committee has ex-
ceeded its granted authority.15 The Report is pregnant with redun-
dancies and, at least in its first installment, is partially taken up 
with nothing more than a simple, but very useful, directory of the 
534 foundations and charitable trusts studied.16 Nevertheless, its 
allegations and findings are provocative of the most careful notice 
by tax lawyers. The gauntlet is thrown down to foundation trustees 
and directors, to corporation stockholder-donors, and to charitable 
12. Id. at 71. The Report also notes that true statistics are obscured in many 
instances because foundations show their assets at a "carrying value," which is normally 
lower than current market value. 
l!!. 4!! Eliz. 1, c. 2. 
14. 64 Stat. 906, 95!! (1950), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 411 (Supp. IV, 196!!). See 
Finance Committee Reports: H. R. REP. No. 2!!19, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. !!6-!!7, 41-42 
(1950); S. REP. No. 2!175, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1950); see also Brown, The New 
Restrictions on Charitable Exemptions and Deductions for Federal Tax Purposes, l!! 
U. P11T. L. REv. 62!! (1952); Eaton, Charitable Foundations and Related Matters Under 
the 1950 Revenue Act, !!7 VA. L. REv. 1, 25!! (1951). 
15. See the remarks of Roger K. Powell, N.Y.U. 22ND INST. ON FED. TAX 921-45 (1964). 
16. The second installment of the REPORT, cited supra note 7, released October 16, 
196!1, contained a study in depth of alleged abuses by three related foundations. The 
remainder reiterated the findings and conclusions of the first installment, cited supra 
note 1. 
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donees all over the country. All persons critical of the content of 
the Report have been challenged to justify both the legal and the 
socio-political role of the modern, tax-exempt charitable corporation. 
It is the purpose of this article to evaluate the major points of 
the first, and main, installment of Congressman Patman's Report 
in the light of existing Internal Revenue Code provisions, Treasury 
regulations, and the more significant federal court decisions and 
Internal Revenue Service rulings. While the Report itself is more 
inclusive, space limitations dictate that this article be confined to 
section 50l(c)(3) organizations-chiefly foundations, tax-exempt 
funds, and charitable trusts. Although the writer will strive to be 
objective, it is difficult to avoid some of the political gloss in which 
the Report is cast and impossible to discuss the ramifications of the 
Report without wallowing in the cross-currents of public policy. 
To be exempt from income tax liability, and to afford private 
donors the benefit of an income or estate tax deduction for con-
tributions, a foundation must be both organized and operated for 
an exempt purpose.17 Thus, a look at the modern application of this 
aged test will be necessary in order to give perspective to Congress-
man Patman's allegations. This being done, we will next determine 
the extent to which the law permits tax-exempt foundations to 
operate businesses for profit even though their charters point to a 
charitable purpose. This second inquiry relates to Congressman 
Patman's charge that foundations not only divert funds to non-
charitable business ventures, but also compete unfairly with legit-
imate businesses. Third, we shall examine Congressman Patman's 
claim that the earnings of many charitable foundations are wrongly 
inuring to the benefit of their own donors, trustees, and other private 
persons. Fourth, the Report charges that some foundations hoard most 
of their exempt income. We shall attempt to determine whether a tax-
exempt organization may successfully defend such a charge by show-
ing long-range plans of charitable expenditures or whether the 
Service does (and should) require prompt application of all charitable 
funds. Must all foundations in the future become active, functional 
charities, or may they operate as conduits to other educational and 
charitable organizations? If the latter, how long and tortuous a con-
duit will be permitted? Fifth, we will see which foundation practices 
criticized by the Report are, in fact, now prohibited by the Internal 
Revenue Code; and, we will examine whether the guidelines of Code 
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.50l(c)(3)-1 (1959). 
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prohibitions are sufficiently definite for the Service to enforce them. 
Finally, if serious abuses can be proved against tax-exempt founda-
tions, it is relevant to ask whether these abuses can be solved and cor-
rected by enforcement of existing laws, or whether new, more strin-
gent laws are necessary. Implicit in these inquiries is an even more 
poignant question-should charity be a private or a public concern? 
This paper cannot, with any degree of wisdom, answer such questions 
of "oughtness," but the Patman Report surely dramatizes the need 
for asking them. 
I. THE "ESTABLISHMENT" OF FOUNDATIONS 
A. The "Organizational" Test 
Any corporation that aspires to become tax-exempt under section 
50l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code must file an application on 
Treasury Form 1023 with the Internal Revenue Service, establishing, 
inter alia, that it is "organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational 
purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals 
•••• " 18 No corporation may safely assume exemption unless such 
a determination has been made by the Service. Once made, however, 
the determination can be relied upon continuously by the corpora-
tion, provided there are no substantial changes in its character, 
purpose, or operation and provided the corporation does not engage 
in a so-called "prohibited transaction."19 Even though the United 
States Supreme Court early stated that "charities are the 'favorites' 
of the law," a rule of strict construction is followed by most courts 
in this country, with the result that the taxpayer must prove it 
comes within the language of the exempting statute.20 
The more modern view is that the term "organized" refers to 
the "real substance and intent of the organization, and not to its 
mere form."21 At one time, exemption status was determined almost 
18. This language from INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 50l(c)(3) has remained sub-
stantially unchanged since the Revenue Act of 1928. Approved applications for ex-
emption on Form 1023, together with any allied papers, are available for inspection 
at the Internal Revenue Service's Washington, D.C., office. See Rev. Proc. 62-30, 1962-2 
CUM. BULL. 512 on the procedure governing requests for exemption, superseding in 
part Rev. Proc. 56-8, 1956-1 CUM. BuLL. 1024. 
19. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(a)-l(a)(l) (1958); see also Rev. Rul. 58-617, 1958-2 CuM. BuLL. 
260, stating that any changes in corporate purposes or operations must be reported 
promptly. · 
20. Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934), affirming 68 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1934). Cf. 
6 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34.02 (1957 ed.). 
21. Ibid. 
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exclusively by looking at the formative papers of an organization-
its articles and by-laws.22 Certainly, an organization's charter is still 
an important evidentiary fact to consider, but obtaining an exemp-
tion is no longer so "cut and dried." Beginning in 1938 with the 
celebrated case of Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner,28 the courts 
have indicated that extrinsic evidence of the intent of the organiza-
tion, as .shown by its motives, acts of charitable donation, and 
management, is just as important as what appears in its charter. 
Thus, in the second Commissioner v. John Danz Charitable Trust 
decision,24 where a charitable trust operated active businesses (a 
hotel and three candy shops) and obviously did not satisfy the 
"operational" test which will be discussed later, the court still found 
that the "organizational" test was met because the motive of the 
trust was to aid the "humanist" movement. What this newer ap-
proach means is simply that the "organizational" test is becoming 
merged with the "operational." To provide sufficient time for the 
Service to study the acts as well as the charter of an applicant, the 
Service has long required that organizations ( except those of a 
"community or public type") actively operate (not merely exist) 
for twelve months before submitting Form 1023 for approval.25 
Only at the end of 1963 was this rule lifted; a determination letter 
will now issue in advance of twelve months of operation, providing 
the applicant organization can describe its proposed exempt opera-
tions in sufficient detail.26 It is doubtful that Congressman Patman 
will look with favor on this latest relaxation of procedure. 
Although corporate articles have been reduced in relative im-
portance, current regulations demonstrate that they must still be 
carefully drafted for exemption. The articles, charter, or constitu-
tion must: 
"(a) Limit the purposes of such organization to one or more 
exempt purposes [enumerated in section 50l(c)(3)]; and 
"(b) ... not expressly empower the organization to engage, 
otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activ-
ities which in themselves are not in furtherance of one or more 
exempt purposes."27 
Draftsmen must be careful of powers as well as purposes. The 
22. See, e.g., Sun-Herald Corp. v. Duggan, 73 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 
294 U.S. 719 (1935). 
23. 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938); see also Dillingham Transp. Bldg., Ltd. v. United 
States, 137 Ct. Cl. 389, 146 F. Supp. 953 (1957). 
24. 284 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1960), affirming, 32 T.C. 469 (1959). 
25. Rev. Proc. 62-30, supra note 18. 
26. Rev. Proc. 63-30, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 769. 
27. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(b)(l)(i) (1959). 
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"organizational" test is not met if the corporate articles empower 
the organization to carry on activities of a business or commercial 
nature, even though such organization is limited by its articles 
to an exempt purpose no broader than those listed in section 501 
(c)(3).28 In composing articles of incorporation, it is easy to miss the 
passage between this Scylla and Charybdis and to run aground on 
taxable shoals by including the dangerous stock phrases for "carry-
ing on business" which are part of the boilerplate of many corporate 
articles. One other point needs mention with respect to drafting. 
The 1959 Treasury Regulations further circumscribed the "organ-
izational" test by providing that the purposes expressed in the 
corporate articles cannot be broader than the purposes enumerated 
in section 50l(c)(3). Evidence aliunde the articles will not correct 
this fault.29 
Although the presence of a single, substantial contrary purpose 
in foundation articles will cause disqualification,80 and the articles 
cannot be broader than the purposes listed in section 50l(c)(3), the 
Patman Report contends that these rules are not effectively enforced. 
It also makes a more profound allegation which, if not directly 
stated, is certainly implied in Congressman Patman's conclusion that 
any profit-making activity of tax-exempt groups reveals a non-char-
itable, noneleemosynary intent. If foundations are to have any 
lebensraum in the future, there must be some determination of what 
constitutes permissible income activity. 
The problem is best illustrated by the Report's general conclu-
sion that foundation ownership of, and receipt of profits from, such 
"active" sources as the operation of rental facilities, buildings, offices, 
garages, hospitals, and the like is bad. The Report also concludes that 
loans by foundations, when secured by income-producing mortgages 
on such active facilities (some of which inevitably are owned by 
"interested parties"), are indicative of non-charitable purposes.81 
Assuming a continuum of passive to active sources of income, on 
one end is receipt by tax-exempt organizations of dividends from 
common stocks and interest from bonds. If this is profit-making 
28. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(b)(l)(iii) (1959). 
29. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(b)(l)(iv) (1959). The last three regulations cited were 
effective for taxable years after July 26, 1959. 
30. See the following illustrative Tax Court cases, holding that one wrong purpose 
taints the whole organization: American Institute for Economic Research v. United 
States, 302 F.2d 934 (Ct. CI. 1962); Stevens Bros. Foundation, 39 T.C. 93 (1962), afl'd 
in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 324 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1963); Leon A. Beeghly 
Fund, 35 T.C. 490 (1960), afl'd on other grounds, !HO F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1962); Best Lock 
Corp., 31 T.C. 1217 (1959) (appeal dismissed). 
31. REPORT 15-16. 
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activity at all, it is certainly unimpeachable as far as the tests of 
exemption are concerned, and, as a federal district court once ex-
pressed, the financial "power" of an organization to make wise 
investments of this nature ought never to be viewed as a "purpose ' 
which must meet the organizational test.32 The area of controversy 
begins as we move from the passive end of the continuum to such 
items as rents, mortgages, and leasebacks. For example, the Report 
cites with disapproval the activity of three foundations in purchasing 
gasoline service stations and leasing them back, together with some 
other commercial buildings, to the sellers. 33 Such an investment is 
not really much different from the purchase of common stocks. It 
assures the receipt of regular income through rent charges, and it 
can be almost as passive as the collection of interest. Of course, if the 
example foundations were engaged in such management duties as 
supervising the normal operations of the gasoline stations, they 
would be involved in commerce and in a trade or business. However, 
the mere receipt of rent, without supervisory duties, ought not to 
threaten loss of exemption. 
Much of ·the difficulty with the Report's conclusions in this area 
lies in its failure to distinguish between the charter purpose of a 
tax-exempt foundation and its sources of income.34 Thus, if the 
articles of an exempt corporation stated the operation of a particular 
business or businesses as a purpose, the "active" end of the con-
tinuum would be reached, and exemption would not be justified 
under the organizational test. But, if the articles impose on the 
trustees duties to retain, invest in, or derive income from rents, 
mortgages, partnerships, etc., the organization should not be con-
demned for carrying out the founder's desires to assure a flow of 
dollars for charitable donation. This point was illustrated in Eugene 
S. Lewis v. United States.35 That case involved a testamentary trust 
that had been set up by the donor to provide medical care and 
educational opportunities for the youth of Sheridan County, 
Wyoming. The donor's will contained an administrative clause 
giving the trustees power to engage in business. The trust corpus 
included a ranch formerly owned by the donor, which was main-
tained by the trust for a short time after his death and then sold. 
In answer to the Internal Revenue Service's claim that the trust had 
32. Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956). 
33. REPORT 14. 
34. This distinction was ably drawn in Bright Star Foundation v. Campbell, 191 F. 
Supp. 845 (N.D. Tex. 1960). 
35. 189 F. Supp. 950 (D. Wyo. 1961). 
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the carrying on of a trade or business as a purpose and, thus, fell 
within the prohibition of Treasury Regulation l.501(c)(3)-l(b)(l)(iii), 
the court held that under the will the trustees were given the power 
"to carry out the express purpose of the trust," that the power to 
engage in business was not a "purpose" on which exemption could 
be judged, and that the organizational test was otherwise satisfied. 
It would seem that the organizational test is not enforced as severely 
in testamentary charitable trust cases for the very reason that the 
creating instrument often imposes duties upon the trustees that are 
more easily subsumed under the category of administrative powers 
than under the designation of ultimate purposes. 
Perhaps we could make peace with Congressman Patman's criti-
cism of some foundations' sources of income by adopting a handy 
rationale used by the Third Circuit in Francis E. McGillick Founda-
tion v. Commissioner.86 Construing section 101(6) of the 1939 Code, 
the predecessor of section 501(c)(3), the court stated that, when the 
"predominate purpose" for which a foundation is organized is, "in 
its broadest sense," religious, charitable, or educational, exemption 
should be granted.87 Scripture Press Foundation v. United States 
stated the rule another way: if the profit-making activity is "inci-
dental" to the organization's main charitable purpose, the demands 
of the organizational test are met.88 Of course, these decisions are 
not fully on point, for they speak also of what standards must be 
met in order for a foundation to be organized "exclusively" for an 
exempt purpose-still another qualifying test. This writer believes 
that, if the distinction between the purposes of a tax-exempt founda-
tion and its sources of income were given more sway, many of Con-
gressman Patman's objections would disappear. 
B. The "Operational" Test 
This second criterion for determining tax exemption under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) cannot be separated naturally from its brother, the 
"organizational" test, "for the true character of an organization must 
be drawn in the final analysis from the manner in which it has been 
operated."30 The applicable Treasury Regulations state: 
"An organization will be regarded as 'operated exclusively' 
for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily 
36. 278 F.2d 643 (lid Cir. 1960), affirming in part, reversing in part 30 T.C. 1130 
(1958). 
37. 278 F.2d at 646; see also Lederer v. Stockton, 260 U.S. 3 (1922). 
38. 152 Ct. Cl. 463, 285 F.2d 800 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962). 
39. 6 MER.TENS, op. cit. supra note 20, at § 34.07. 
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in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt pur-
poses specified in section 50l(c)(3). An organization will not be 
so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities 
is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose."40 
At this point, it should also be noted that organizations are not 
"operated exclusively" for an exempt purpose if their net earnings 
inure in whole or in part to the benefit of a private individual, or if 
their activities attempt to influence legislation.41 
Much of what has been said about the organizational test also 
applies to the operational test. No discussion of either would be 
complete, however, without mentioning briefly a doctrinaire dispute 
which, before 1950, raged among the federal circuits. The dispute 
centered upon the question of how far a foundation may justify 
dubious activity (i.e., active profit-making) by dedicating all the 
fruits of that activity to a clearly exempt purpose. Almost all the 
landmark cases in the area of charitable tax-exemptions were aligned 
on one side or the other of this dispute. The "grandfather" case was 
T-rinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, a 1924 decision of the 
United States Supreme Court.42 It involved a nonprofit religious 
corporation which derived ten per cent of its income from a minor 
business activity-the selling of chocolates and sacramental wine. 
Even had this quasi-commercial activity constituted a larger fraction 
of its income, however, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court would 
have denied the exemption, for the Court found that, since the 
"destination" of the business income was gifts ·to religious recipients, 
the organization was "operated exclusively" for religious purposes. 
Commercial sales of wine were held perfectly within its permissible 
operations. This pronouncement became known, not surprisingly, as 
the "destination test." Under its auspices, in Roche's Beach, Inc. v. 
Commissioner,43 a nonprofit corporation having charter-given duties 
of operating a bathing beach (an outright commercial activity) was 
nevertheless held exempt on the ground ·that the ultimate destina-
tion of the revenue was charity. "No reason is apparent to us," the 
court stated, "why Congress should wish to deny exemption to a 
corporation organized and operated exclusively to feed a charitable 
purpose when it undoubtedly grants it if the corporation itself ad-
ministers the charity."44 The "destination of income" approach of 
40. Treas. Reg. § I.50l(c)(3)-l(c)(l) (1959). (Emphasis added.) 
41. See Treas. Regs. §§ l.50l(a)-l(d) (1958) and I.503{c)-l (1959). 
42. 263 U.S. 578 (1924). 
43. 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938). 
44. Id. at 779. 
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the Second Circuit was followed by the Third,45 Fifth,46 Sixth,47 and 
Seventh Circuits,48 and by the Court of Claims.49 
On the other side of the dispute, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits 
refused to accept the "destination" test as a justification for the com-
mercial competition of a foundation with other taxable businesses. 
The origin of tax-exempt income, not its destination, was the test 
they applied. Ralph H. Eaton Foundation v. Commissioner5° pro-
vides an example. There, a foundation, organized exclusively for 
charitable and religious purposes, operated farming, real estate, and 
even sports clothes businesses, turning over the profits to exempt 
organizations. The court reasoned that, although such dedication of 
business profits might be an "activity," it was certainly not the 
exclusive, or even the principal, activity of the foundation. Instead, 
the court held the principal activity was retail sales in the stream of 
commerce, and funds originating from this kind of income-producing 
activity should not be exempt. Decisions of this nature remind us 
once again of the tightrope courts must walk when judicial classifica-
tions are made. Since most income of most foundations is derived 
from the profits of some business, it is often difficult for courts to 
draw the line between a permissible origin of income and an im-
proper one. To get around the difficulties of such a balancing act, 
some courts have settled the classification of exempt income on the 
grounds of the "exclusivity" of the tax-exempt's operations. This 
rationale holds that, if the organization actually does operate a busi-
ness, the business or activity itself must be exclusively (meaning 
"primarily") charitable, educational, or religious in character.51 
The battle of the circuits was resolved in favor of the Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits by the Revenue Act of 1950,52 which expressly abol-
ished the "destination of income" approach. This important legisla-
tion provides what may be the most effective machinery presently 
existing for the enforcement of many of Congressman Patman's con-
clusions. 
45. C. F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951), reversing, 14 T.C. 922 
(1950). 
46. Willingham v. Home Oil Mill, 181 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 
(1950). 
47. Lichter Foundation v. Welch, 247 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1957) and 269 F.2d 142 
(6th Cir. 1959); Comm'r v. Orton, 173 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949), affirming, 9 T.C. 533 
(1947). The Lichter case, supra, however, was based on pre-1950 facts. 
48. Arthur Jordan Foundation v. Comm'r, 210 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1954). 
49. Dillingham Transp. Bldg., Ltd, v. United States, 137 Ct. Cl. 389, 146 F. Supp. 
953 (1957). 
50. 219 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1955). 
51. This appears to have been the rationale in United States v. Community Servs., 
Inc., 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 842 U.S. 932 (1952). 
52. 64 Stat. 906, 953, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 411 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
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II. THE "UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME" PROBLEM 
A. Competition of Foundations With Private Business 
If the Patman Report has a single leading finding, it is that tax.-
exempt foundations are entering ·the sphere of private business, 
particularly small business, and, with untaxed money, are driving 
out of business corporate enterprises which must make do with forty-
eight per cent of their real income. This is a seemingly well-inten-
tioned and emphatic charge, and the Report goes to great lengths to 
document it. 
The Report observes that many foundations operate "testing 
services," which are used by the organizations not only to assist in 
studies and the granting of funds but also to attract the interest and 
subscriptions of commercial corporations. It is pointed out that 
seven of these tax-exempt groups grossed over 100 million dollars 
from research and testing business during 1959.53 In offering tests, 
data, or services to schools and businesses all over the country, exempt 
testing organizations obviously occupy the same field as private 
testing services which sell similar techniques, information, and 
know-how to the same groups of customers. An exempt testing cor-
poration (often the subsidiary of a larger foundation) is able, in 
many instances, to outbid a private concern by quoting break-even 
or even loss figures. 
The attack is not confined to testing. The Report claims that 
several scientific research foundations, including a well-known na-
tional society which has a net worth in excess of 26 million 
dollars,54 have, in part, jumped from "basic" research into "applied" 
research. In the latter activity, specific problems are solicited from 
private persons or from the federal govemment.55 Not being re-
strained by the economic necessity of paying taxes, of showing a 
profit, of paying cash dividends, or indeed of answering to any 
stockholders, the exempt groups have several built-in advantages 
which could insure success in the competitive arena. The same argu-
ment is extended by the Report to tax-exempt metropolitan plan-
ning commissions, to consulting engineers, to national defense con-
tractors, and to food and dietary researchers. All of these compete 
with private, taxable counterparts.56 
It is surprising that Congressman Patman does not cite, or even 
53. REPORT 9. 
54. REPORT 13. 
55. Ibid. 
56. REPORT 10-13. 
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appear to notice, the limiting definitions of "testing for public 
safety" and "scientific research" (as well as "educational," "chari-
table" and "religious") contained in the governing regulations under 
section 50l(c)(3). "Scientific research," for example, 
" ... does not include activities of a type ordinarily carried 
on as an incident to commercial or industrial operations, as, 
for example, the ordinary testing or inspection of materials or 
products or the designing or construction of equipment, build-
ings, etc."57 
Instead, that term will give rise to an exemption only 
" ... if the results of such research (including any patents, 
copyrights, processes, or formulae resulting from such research) 
are made available to the public on a nondiscriminatory basis."68 
Certainly, the emphasis given to noncommercial, nondiscriminatory 
research by the above definitions ought to provide a guideline of 
sorts for Internal Revenue Service policing of some alleged unfair 
competition between exempt and nonexempt organizations. More-
over, the same regulations circumscribe the permissible activity of 
other tax-exempt "scientific organizations." For example, such 
organizations may not limit the fruits of their research to their 
creators (often the "creators" are profit corporations in the same line 
of business), and they may not retain ownership of more than an 
insubstantial portion of the patents, formulae, etc., resulting from 
their research.59 
B. "Feeder' Corporations 
Although the Code definitions of such terms as "scientific re-
search" and "testing for public safety" seem to exclude the abuses 
Congressman Patman talked about, specific sanctions to prevent 
these abuses appeared in the 1950 legislation. By that year, actual 
instances of unfair competition between exempt and nonexempt 
organizations had mounted to such a point that Congress determined 
to correct the situation.60 A nationwide vendor of macaroni, for ex-
ample, could receive its profits free of tax because they were destined 
for an educational institution.fl1 A commercial beach operator en-
57. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(5)(ii) (1961). 
58. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(5)(iii)(a) (1961). 
59. Treas. Reg. §' l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(5)(iv) (1961). 
60. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1950); S. REP. No. 2375, 
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1950); see also Veterans Foundation v. United States, 281 
F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1960), affirming 178 F. Supp. 234 (D. Utah 1959). 
61. See C. F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951), reversing 14 T.C. 
922 (1950). 
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joyed the same advantage over its competition because it directed its 
net profits to charity.62 As a result of such inequities, some basic safe-
guards calculated to control active business competition by tax-
exempts were enacted. No longer could the excuse of charitable 
destination of income secure a free ticket to tax exemption. 
First, the Revenue Act of 1950 provided (by what is now section 
502, Internal Revenue Code) that an organization operated for the 
"primary purpose of carrying on a trade or business for profit" is not 
exempt merely because all of its profits are payable to some organiza-
tion that is exempt.63 Such so-called "feeder corporations" were 
thenceforth taxable at full corporate rates, just as any nonexempt 
corporation in the same line of business. Second, even though a 
corporation's primary purpose was within one of the section 501 
(c)(3) exemptions, if it did in fact carry on a trade or business 
"unrelated" to its exempt purpose, the new legislation (now sec-
tion 511 of the Code) imposed the regular corporate tax on the 
income derived from the "unrelated business."64 Corporations in 
this second classification, however, were still exempt provided they 
carried on substantial charitable activities to which, by definition, 
their trade or business activity could be "unrelated." The tax 
imposed on the unrelated activity was to have no adverse effect 
upon the organization's exempt status. Only one concession was 
made to pre-1950 rules. If an exempt corporation owned active 
income-producing property (as distinguished from stocks, bonds, or 
other intangibles), such income remained exempt under the 1950 
changes, provided the corporation was organized for the exclusive 
purpose of "holding title to [the] property, collecting income there-
from, and turning over the entire amount thereof, less expenses, to 
an organization which is itself exempt. . .. "65 Such "title-holding 
corporations" are to be clearly distinguished from corporations 
actually carrying on some trade or business.66 
Section 513(a) of the Internal Revenue Code defines an "unre-
lated trade or business" as follows: 
" ... any trade or business the conduct of which is not sub-
62. See Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938). 
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-l(a) (1958). The 1950.legislation referred to in the text be• 
came §§ 421-24 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and was known as "Supplement 
U." A good discussion of this statute can be found in Sugarman &: Pomeroy, Business 
Income of Exempt Organizations, 46 VA. L. REv. 424 (1960). 
64. However, "unrelated business income" of a church is still exempt from income 
taxation. For the definition of a "church," see De La Salle Institute v. United States, 
195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961). 
65. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 50l(c)(2); Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(2)-l(a) (1958). 
66. Ibid. 
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stantially related (aside from the need of such organization for 
income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to 
the exercise or performance by such organization of its chari-
table, educational, or other purpose or function .... " 
However, a trade or business engaged in by the exempt organiza-
tion without compensation, or which the organization carries on 
for the convenience of its members, officers, or employees, or which 
involves the sale of merchandise donated to the organization, is 
not "unrelated" and, therefore, is within the pale of permissibility.67 
Two conditions are required for taxability of such business income. 
First, the "unrelated trade or business" must involve activity sub-
stantially different from that authorized by the exempt corporation's 
articles. Second, the "unrelated trade or business" must be "regu-
larly carried on" by the corporation.68 
Sporadic, intermittent, or isolated business activity engaged in 
by a foundation is not considered enough of a deviation from 
exempt operations to cause imposition of tax. Nor, of course, is the 
receipt of dividends, interest, royalties from natural resources, bald 
rents from real estate, or capital gains from non-inventory property 
called "unrelated income" ;69 all of these items are sufficiently passive 
in character to demonstrate that their mere receipt is not the same 
as the carrying on of a trade or business.70 Similarly, the purchase or 
ownership of oil production payments is not treated in the same 
way as oil prospecting or active participation in oil drilling.71 And, 
all income derived by fundamental research organizations from re-
search performed for any person is not "unrelated" if the results are 
made freely available to the public.72 The same is true of research 
performed for the federal government or for any state or political 
subdivision.73 
It must be emphasized that the term "trade or business" (which 
is common to sections 502 and 512) must be read with the require-
ment that such activity be a primary purpose of the organization 
67. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 513(a)(l)-(3). Nor does the term "trade or business" 
include the renting out by an exempt organization of its own real property. The latter 
activity is governed by the provisions of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 514, which deal with 
business leases and business lease indebtedness. Generally, rental income from real 
estate is taxable to otherwise exempt organizations, with the exception of churches, to 
the extent that the property is purchased with borrowed funds. See INT. REv. CODE OF 
1954, § 5ll(a). 
68. See Treas. Reg. § l.513-l(a)(2) (1958); see also INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 512(a)-
69. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b)(l)-(3), (5) .. 
70. See Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956). 
71. Force Foundation v. United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9115 (N.D. Tex. 1962). 
72. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b)(9). 
73. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b)(7). 
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before the organization can be written off as a feeder. All circum-
stances, including the size and extent of the trade or business, as 
well as the comparable size and scope of the exempt activity, must 
be taken into account in determining a primary purpose. 74 
C. Enforcement in the Courts 
There is a practical answer and an answer grounded on policy 
to the question of whether the existence of the rules regarding 
feeder corporations and unrelated business income refutes the Pat-
man Report's conclusion that the penalty of loss of exemption 
should be imposed upon a foundation engaging in business, even 
indirectly. The practical, demonstrable answer is found in the 
enforcement courts have given to the 1950 legislation. An example 
is provided by the recent Court of Claims decision in SICO Founda-
tion v. United States.75 Plaintiff in that case was a nonstock, chari-
table corporation that had owned controlling stock interests in 
several other corporations engaged in the sale and distribution of 
petroleum products. Through their dissolution, plaintiff acquired 
the assets of these subsidiaries and commenced direct operation of 
their businesses. In an earlier decision, the court had ruled plaintiff 
exempt despite this take-over, because the destination of its profits 
was an educational scholarship program.76 Indeed, plaintiff had 
continued to distribute all its income in this manner. But, once the 
1950 Revenue Act became applicable, plaintiff found itself back 
before the court, again defending its right to an exemption. On this 
second confrontation, the court found plaintiff to be a nonexempt 
feeder corporation, saying: 
"That it [plaintiff] gave all its profits to an educational 
institution availeth it nothing in the mundane field of taxation, 
however much the children in our schools have profited from 
its beneficence."77 
Plaintiff's argument that, instead of losing its exemption, it should 
be taxable only on its unrelated business income also was found to 
"availeth it nothing," since plaintiff had no direct charitable or 
educational activities to which such income could be "unrelated." 
Significantly, the court persevered in its holding despite the founda-
tion's claim that not all of its income originated from the petroleum 
business, but that substantial passive income in the form of interest 
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-l(a) (1958). 
75. 155 Ct. Cl. 554, 295 F.2d 924 (1961). 
76. SICO Co. v. United States, 121 Ct. Cl. 373, 102 F. Supp. 197 (1952). 
77. 295 F.2d 924, 925 (1961). 
November 1964] Patman Report 111 
and rent was earned. The answer to this, the court remarked, is 
that Congress did not limit the scope of section 301(b) of the 1950 
Revenue Act to organizations whose exclusive purpose was the 
conduct of a trade or business; the effect of that section extended 
to those whose primary purpose was such activity.78 
During the same year as the SICO decision, the Court of Claims 
reinforced its viewpoint. In Scripture Press Foundation v. United 
States,70 plaintiff foundation had succeeded to the business of an 
Illinois profit corporation that prepared and sold religious literature 
and received large profits therefrom. The court conceded that 
large profits did not necessarily mean that the organization was 
non-charitable, although such commercial success was certainly some 
evidence of a business character. However, despite the meritorious 
goals of the foundation, its improvement of Sunday Schools, and its 
furnishing of religious materials, the court held that the test of 
exemption was not met-the sale of religious literature was not 
incidental to the foundation's religious activities but was, instead, 
its primary activity. In so holding, the court also noticed that, in 
1957, the foundation had 1.6 million dollars in accumulated capital 
and surplus and only 72 thousand dollars in expenditures. 
The Tenth Circuit came to a like conclusion in Veterans 
Foundation v. United States,80 wherein plaintiff claimed exemption 
£or profits gained from thrift sales of used clothing and other 
merchandise in two Utah stores. The sales operation was held 
to be the primary purpose of the foundation, making it a classic 
feeder corporation. The Ninth Circuit had an even more obvious 
violation of tax-exempt purposes before it in Randall Foundation, 
Inc. v. Riddell.81 There, a nonprofit corporation had been formed 
with a rather vague charitable design. Actually, the organization's 
chief activity was the buying, selling, and trading of oil stocks and 
other securities, an occupation which paralleled similar individual 
activity of its donor to the extent that the same brokers were often 
used by both. Although the profits and gains of the corporation 
did not inure directly to the donor, the court found that the chief 
purpose of the foundation was to engage in highly speculative busi-
ness transactions. With little difficulty, the feeder corporation pro-
visions were invoked. 
78. Id. at 928. 
79. 152 Ct. Cl. 463, 285 F.2d 800 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962); cf., A. A. 
Allen Revivals, Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1435 (1963). 
80. 281 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1960), affirming 178 F. Supp. 234 (D. Utah 1959). 
81. 244 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1957). 
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The Court of Claims, whose decisions figure most prominently 
in this area, in 1962 decided a case, the language of which some-
what clairvoyantly furnishes an example of the kind of judicial 
vigilance Congressman Patman now asks. In American Institute for 
Economic Research v. United States,82 plaintiff education corpora-
tion's articles properly limited it to economics study and the dissem-
ination of economic information to the general public. In opera-
tion, however, it published two periodicals that gave investment 
advice, analyses of certain traded securities, and even pointers on 
how subscribers should vote on pending corporate mergers. Plain-
tiff further provided a continuous supervision service for some three 
hundred clients, charging one-fourth of one per cent of the capital 
involved as a service fee. Insurance advice and estate planning were 
other aids made available. In 1957 and 1958, plaintiff had received 
almost half a million dollars from subscriptions to these services. The 
court found that such services were those commonly associated with 
commercial enterprises and held that, since plaintiff had chosen to 
compete with business firms offering similar services, it was a feeder 
corporation and must bear the tax consequences of its acts. 88 
To be sure, loopholes have arisen in the interstices among 
the above holdings and among the controlling regulations. A founda-
tion may freely create a wholly-owned subsidiary that does nothing 
but engage in commercial activity. While the subsidiary itself is 
taxed, the income later passed on to the exempt parent corporation 
is not "unrelated" business income to the parent.84 Conceivably, 
the door is open for a foundation to create several small business 
subsidiaries within the lower normal tax bracket; favorable overall 
tax results would thereby be achieved, provided the overriding 
organizational and operational tests were met. Another avenue of 
escape from the feeder corporation rules is illustrated by the Court 
of Claims decision in Hospital Bureau of Standards and Supplies, 
Inc. v. United States.85 There, the plaintiff bought supplies at a 
discount and performed research and other technical services for 
several charitable hospitals that took memberships in plaintiff. All 
of plaintiff's net income from dues and discounts was returned to 
the members as patronage dividends. Plaintiff was held not to be 
a feeder, the court pointing out that it performed services for its 
82. 302 F.2d 934 (Ct. Cl. 1962). 
83. Id. at 938. 
84. See Amon G. Carter Foundation v. United States, 58·1 U.S. Tax Cas. 'ii 9342 
(N.D. Tex. 1958). 
85. 141 Ct. Cl. 91, 158 F. Supp. 560 (1958). 
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members that they otherwise would have had to assume themselves. 
Plaintiff's operations, even though commercial, were excused on the 
basis that they bore a "close and intimate relationship" to the very 
functioning of the exempt hospitals. A third route around the 
unrelated business income provisions lies in Internal Revenue Code 
section 501(c)(4), which deals with civic organizations and organiza-
tions operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare. Tax 
lawyers will agree that often the purposes of a section 50l(c)(3) 
educational or charitable organization spill over into those of an 
organization for social welfare. While contributions to the latter are 
not deductible by the donor,86 a social welfare organization does not 
pay a tax on unrelated business income.87 Thus, a choice of taxable 
consequences is open to organizations having this dual identity. 
D. Policy Considerations 
Wholly aside from the monitoring of foundations' business 
activities by the courts, are there reasons why foundations should 
be divorced from commercial activity altogether-even if such ac-
tivity leads only to a tax on unrelated business income? Congress-
man Patman deplores all degrees of business activity by foundations. 
We should look briefly at the arguments on each side of this 
question. 
Foundation trustees can be expected to maintain that often an 
unrelated business provides a valuable source of charitable funds at 
higher yields than more passive investments. They question the 
validity of a distinction between stock in the business and the 
business itself. Moreover, many organizations are simply given or 
bequeathed such businesses by some donor, and they have no pos-
sible alternative but to assume control and run the enterprise in 
the best manner possible. To confiscate or even penalize such 
inheritance, it is argued, would often work a hardship on the 
exempt organization and cause it, particularly if it is a charitable 
trust, to act in violation of the donative intent. Finally, it is con-
tended that there is persuasive analogy in the fact that profit cor-
porations freely carry on exempt activities and have exempt appen-
dages (qualified pension trusts are an obvious example). 
But Congressman Patman makes a definite point in his asser-
tions. To a small commercial operation, the incidental benefits in 
being operated by a large and rich foundation are weighty enough 
86, Such organizations are excluded from the benefits of INT. REv. Com;: OF 1954, 
§ 170(c). 
87. See Veterans Foundation v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 234 (D. Utah 1959). 
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to be anti-competitive in many instances. Imagine the effect of the 
name, publicity, and resources of the Ford Foundation behind a 
small profit operation selling reference books. To be sure, the 
business income derived would form an infinitesimal part of the 
Foundation's gross income, but the weight of the Foundation's name 
and reputation, maintained by tax-free funds, would be magnified 
greatly among competing reference book firms. In many instances, 
the commercial activity carried on by the foundation is not "in-
herited" or thrust upon it, but rather is entered into out of free 
choice and in near oblivion to countless profit corporations that 
could perform the same activity for hire. The danger to founda-
tions-all foundations-in such practice is the danger of swinging 
too far off the base of functional charitable activity. A charitable 
hospital can rightly open its doors to sick and infirm indigents, but it 
should not use its capital, its plant, its accumulated equipment, and 
its generally tax-free overhead to treat those who have adequate 
funds and hospitalization insurance. Of course, the "organizational" 
test would certainly permit a hospital to charge fees covering its costs 
and expenses. The activity of an economics research institute in 
selling or giving out advice on the stock market is in a different 
category. Even if this service "flows naturally" from exempt activity, 
the presence of thousands of profit-making taxable investment and 
stock analysis firms suggests that a foundation which engages in such 
activity is roaming far beyond its functional charitable or educa-
tional base. 
Distinctions in this area are admittedly arbitrary at times. Criteria 
defining correct practices are often penumbra!. Perhaps a "chari-
table purpose" doctrine, similar to the "business purpose" test of 
tax law jurisprudence, would serve to cull out the desirable inci-
dental foundation competitiveness from that which might have a 
more predatory purpose and effect. On the one hand, no tax-exempt 
organization that has an active business thrust upon it (as by gift or 
inheritance) should be forced to incur the hardship of a sacrificial 
divestiture, particularly when the donor's basis must be assumed. 
On the other hand, purchase by a foundation of a hotel, an office 
building, a retail bookstore, or a manufacturing plant points as 
much to a purpose of active business engagement as it does to a 
purpose of securing a higher yield of income for charitable pur-
poses. Voluntary acquisitions of this nature should result in a heavy 
burden of proof being placed on the acquiring foundations to show 
a predominant charitable purpose behind the acquisition. 
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III. INUREMENT OF FOUNDATION FUNDS TO PRIVATE BENEFIT 
AND THE "PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS" RULE 
A. The Problem 
To this point we have discussed the face that foundations turn to 
the public-how much participation in non-charitable commercial 
activities courts will allow tax-exempt organizations. What is lesser 
known, and in this writer's opinion far more important, is the 
private life of foundations within and among their own donors, 
trustees, and related profit corporations. The balance of this article 
is devoted to this interior problem-how it is manifested in inner-
dealings between foundations and their creators, in so-called "prohib-
ited transactions" engaged in by foundations, and in foundation 
accumulation or "hoarding" of income. For analytical purposes, it is 
impossible to put these three practices into neat categories; they over-
flow upon one another both in the Code and in actual occurrence. 
Perhaps as good a way as any to begin is by discussing the inure-
ment of foundation funds to private persons (e.g., donors, trustees, 
donors' relatives, etc.). A prohibition against su~h inurement first 
appears in the definitional section of the Code, section 50l(c)(3). 
But the regulations implementing this section are not as enlightening 
as the standards set forth in section 503, dealing with "prohibited 
transactions" which, if violated, will result in revocation of exempt 
status. Our inquiry must bridge both sections of the statute because 
the various "prohibited transactions" are really specific examples 
of how foundation income can wrongly "inure" to the benefit of 
private persons. The charges made by the Patman Report in this 
area provide a good introduction. 
Indeed, one need not read far into the Report before encounter-
ing cited instances of inner-dealing between tax-exempt groups 
and other interested parties. One instance cited involved a bank 
(Bank X) which held control (with another bank) of a large dealer 
in United States Government bonds, bankers acceptances, and 
negotiable time certificates. It had gradually acquired stock in the 
dealer from 1918 to 1959. Bank X's cost basis for the stock was 
1.548 million dollars. Bank X established a charitable trust and 
contributed to it the stock in the dealer at a time when the stock 
was worth 2.493 million dollars on the market. Eight months later, 
the charitable trust sold the same stock to foundations and institu-
tional investors. After the sale, the trust filed for and received a 
Treasury letter granting tax-exemption retroactively to a date before 
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the sale. The Report criticized Bank X for avoiding a capital gains 
tax on almost one million dollars, calling the charitable trust a 
handy medium for the shelter of an otherwise taxable profit.BB 
Other abuses are cited. Foundations are said to be "agents of 
concentration," often holding over ten per cent of the outstanding 
stock of a corporation.89 Control of such a corporation can then be 
managed by an easy, casual alliance between the foundation's hold-
ings and the holdings of the donor's family members. Nonvoting 
stock held by a family foundation can sometimes be converted to 
voting stock.90 Private individuals, often the donor or the donor's 
family, may receive annuities from a tax-exempt organization. And 
aside from gifts, related persons or corporations may receive loans 
of money from foundations that they have either created or sup-
ported.91 The Report cites one large foundation loan to a private 
corporation which bore an interest rate of only 2.65 per cent.92 
Finally, donors have been known to repurchase assets from their 
foundations, getting a stepped-up cost basis free of tax in the proc-
ess.93 Too often, it seems, foundations have been the wheel horses 
for quick recapture of securities-at higher cost bases and with no 
tax on double or even triple appreciation of values. 
The Patman Report also cites transactions between corporation-
created foundations and the same corporation's employees-particu-
larly transactions involving scholarships, fellowships, and other edu-
cational benefits. Another use made of the characteristic liquidity 
of foundations is the payment of heavy federal estate taxes owed 
by the donors' executors.94 Indeed, in all such instances, collusion 
and inner-dealing have been charged by the Report as being ramp-
ant, uncontrollable, and yet perfectly within existing law and regula-
tions. 
B. The Statute 
Regulations implementing section 50I(c)(3) state: "An organiza-
tion is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if 
its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private 
shareholders or individuals."915 The words "private shareholder or 
individual" refer to persons who have a personal and private interest 
88. See REPORT 8-9. 
89. See id. at 8. 
90. Ibid. 
91. Loan abuses are cited in id. at 80. 
92. Id. at 79. 
93. Id. at 81. 
94. Ibid. 
95. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(c)(2) (1959). 
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in the activities of the organization.96 To discover what constitutes 
such inurement and who might have such a private interest, we 
must turn to the regulations under section 503 of the Code. Those 
regulations outline certain transactions that are prohibited if they 
inure to the private advantage of any of the following: 
I. The creator of the organization (if a trust), 
2. Any substantial contributor to the organization, 
3. A member of the family of the creator or substantial con-
tributor, or 
4. A corporation in which at least fifty per cent of the 
outstanding voting stock is owned by the creator or substantial 
contributor.97 
In pertinent (and oversimplified) part, the prohibited transactions 
are: 
I. Loans to the persons or corporations enumerated above 
"without receipt of adequate security or a reasonable rate of 
interest."98 "Adequate security" means something more than a 
mere promise to pay. Security cannot be the stock of the corpo-
rate borrower, but a mortgage on other property of the bor-
rower of sufficient value so that foreclosure would liquidate the 
debt can be adequate security.99 
2. Payment of any compensation in excess of a reasonable 
allowance for salaries for personal services actually rendered 
(presumably not blanket retainer fees) to the persons or corpo-
rations listed above, 
3. Furnishing any services on a preferential basis to such 
persons or corporations, 
4. Purchasing a substantial amount of securities or other 
property at more than an adequate consideration from such 
persons or corporations, 
5. Selling a substantial amount of the foundation's own 
securities or other property for less than an adequate considera-
tion to such persons or corporations, 
6. Engaging in any other transactions which cause a sub-
stantial diversion of income or corpus to such persons or corpo-
rations.100 
In gauging the Patman Report criticism in this area, it is signif-
icant to note that none of the above items prohibit inner-dealing 
96. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(a)-l(c) (1958). 
97. See Treas. Reg. § l.50!1(c)-l(a) (1959). Family membership is determined by the 
rules of INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 267(c)(4). 
98. Treas. Reg. § l.50!1(c)-l(a) (1959). 
99. See examples given under Treas. Reg. § l.50!1(c)-l(c) (1959). See also Donald G. 
Griswold, !19 T.C. 620 (1962). 
100. These six types of transactions have been substantially copied from INT. REv. 
CODE OF 1954, § 50!1(c). Except for § 50!1(c)(l), the remaining paragraphs are not elab-
orated or further explained in the regulations. 
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per se. Indeed, the pre-enactment materials relating to section 503 
(section 331 of the Revenue Act of 1950) show that at first it had 
been proposed to deny deductions to donors if any substantial frac-
tion of the recipient organization's assets were used to purchase 
securities or other property from the donors or from other trustees. 
However, the committee that reported on the bill believed that 
such a provision would have been too harsh, and no objection was 
seen to inner-dealings provided they were conducted at arm's 
length.101 Such has been the rule since 1950. One would have to bar 
dealings between foundations and interested parties completely 
to change it. 
While the prohibitions listed above appear fairly inclusive, there 
are at least two gaping lacunae in the statute. The first is that a tax-
exempt organization, if acting incidentally to its charter purpose, is 
not prohibited by this statutory language from furnishing prefer-
ential services to, giving securities to, or paying an honorarium or 
some unearned gratuity to a private person or corporation which 
is not within one of the four categories of recipients spelled out in 
the regulations under section 503(c).102 Thus, at this juncture, the 
statute would seem justifiably exposed to the criticism that exempt 
funds can find their way into indi'1idual, nonexempt hands, unless 
interpretative cases and commentary have narrowed this apparent 
liberality. 
The second area excepted from the "policeman" requirements 
of section 503 is composed of those organizations listed in section 
503(b)-religious organizations, schools with regular faculties and 
curricula, federal, state or public-supported organizations, and 
medical care, medical education, or medical research organizations. 
As to these broad exceptions, the six types of prohibited transactions 
enumerated above are not limitations. Nevertheless, it has been held 
that even these more unfettered groups are still subject to the 
general, and more basic, standard of section 50l(c)(3)-the injunc-
tion that net earnings may not inure to private benefit.103 
101. See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 36-37, 123 (1950); 1950-2 CUM. BULL. 
483, at 510-511, 571; and CoNF. REP. No. 3124, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1950), 1950-2 
CuM. BULL. 580, 591. Cf., Revenue Act of 1964, P.L. 88-272, § 209(d)(l), 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 170 (1964), which amends INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170 by adding § 170(g). Section 
170(g)(4) provides that even arm's-length purchases or sales of securities by foundations 
to donors, family members, donors' employees, and officers or employees of controlled 
corporations will result in disqualification of such foundations from the "unlimited 
charitable contributions deduction" unless the transaction involves only "a minimal 
amount of securities or other property." Query: will this specific disqualification become 
a more general "prohibited transaction" at some future time? 
102. See -materials cited note 97 supra. 
103. For a recent case, see Kenner v. Comm'r, 318 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1963), affirming 
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Before discussing how the courts have interpreted these provi-
sions, it should be noted parenthetically that the section of the 
Internal Revenue Code that deals with individual deductions of 
charitable contributions from income subject to tax-section l 70(c) 
(2)-also contains the section 50l(c)(3) standard of inurement and 
adds the further prohibition that no substantial part of the activities 
of a tax-exempt organization may be used to carry on propaganda or 
attempt to influence legislation. This latter activity also amounts to 
a prohibited transaction; but the Patman Report does not emphasize 
any political role that foundations may be playing. The writer will 
omit further mention of this activity in the interest of space limita-
tion. 
C. Significant Cases 
The sweep of the general checkrein on inner-dealing-that 
foundation earnings may not inure to the benefit of private share-
holders or individuals-has been broadened in scope by at least 
one learned commentator: 
"[I] fa particular individual or limited number of individuals 
reap commercial benefits from the operation of the instrumen-
tality, though they do not do so by direct acquisition or pay-
ment over to them of its earnings, the earnings may neverthe-
less 'inure' to their 'benefit' .... "104 
But several courts have given the general inurement standard of 
section 50l(c)(3) a very literal interpretation and have permitted 
a variety of inner-dealing, thus adding some justification to Con-
gressman Patman's criticism. In Boman v. Commissioner,1°5 a foun-
dation which ovmed a clinic building leased the furnishings and 
equipment to a partnership of practicing physicians who controlled 
the foundation. The court observed that the partner-physicians 
received no free services from the foundation and that they paid 
an adequate rental for the facilities, even though, as trustees of the 
foundation, they controlled the rental rate. In upholding exemp-
tion, the court quoted a 1938 case, Northwestern Municipal Associa-
tion v. United States, on "incidental benefits": 
"If its [the charitable corporation's] main purpose is to 
benefit its shareholders or individuals it is not exempt. On the 
20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 185 (1961) (the donor-physician had loaned money to the 
hospital but had also at later times withdrawn substantial sums from hospital ac-
counts to pay his own bills). 
104, 6 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34.13 (1957 ed.). 
105. 240 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1957), reversing 26 T.C. 660 (1956). 
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other hand, if benefit to the individuals is secondary and inci-
dental, it is exempt."106 
This principle was carried even further in Huron Clinic Founda-
tion v. United States,101 a very liberal decision. The plaintiff 
foundation in that case had leased a building to an association of 
physicians. The Commissioner argued that the rental paid by the 
physicians (and hence their expense deduction) was high and that 
the charitable contributions made by the foundation were small, 
so small that a surplus of three times the foundation's annual gross 
income had accumulated. Despite this, and despite the power of the 
foundation to set the rent, the court held there was no improper 
inurement. 
Nor does favoritism or "selectivity" of beneficiaries necessarily 
result in a finding of inurement as long as the selectivity is among 
charitable objects. For example, a recent charitable trust specified 
that contributions to a country hospital district for free hospital 
rooms should go first to the specific trust beneficiaries, then to such 
other persons (presumably unrestricted) as the hospital directors 
might choose. Although this manner of disposition of benefits was 
held not exclusively charitable, the court's decision conceded that, 
had all the trust beneficiaries been needy or indigent, there would 
be no illegality.108 Indeed, the word "charitable" implies a service 
or a gift for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons.109 If the 
donor's relatives or other interested parties are incidentally mem-
bers of that general class, inurement to them of benefits is not fatal 
to tax exemption. Thus, while class membership will permit receipt 
of benefits, the donor, his trustees, or family members may not be 
disproportionate recipients and obviously may not stand out in the 
class. For example, where a taxpayer's son was one of a number of 
free patients in a tax-exempt crippled children's organization, the 
taxpayer was still allowed a deduction for his contribution. 110 But, 
where a corporation organized an educational foundation to provide 
educational opportunities to its employees' children, a director of 
the corporation was not allowed to deduct his contribution to the 
foundation while his own child was receiving thirty per cent of the 
total funds.111 
106. 99 F.2d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 1938). 
107. 212 F. Supp. 847 (S.D.S.D. 1962), remanded by 324 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1963). 
108. United States v. Bank of America Nat'! Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 317 F.2d 859 (9th 
Cir. 1963). 
109. Rev. Rul. 56-138, 1956-1 Cu:M. BULL. 202; Rev. Rul. 56-304, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 
306. 
llO. Marshall v. Welch, 197 F. Supp. 874 (S.D. Ohio 1961). 
Ill. Charleston Chair Co. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 126 (E.D.S.C. 1962). 
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Nor is a charitable foundation precluded from making grants 
or distributions to individuals who are not members of a class, 
provided the distributions are made on a true charitable basis and 
in furtherance of the foundation's exempt purposes.112 Adequate 
case histories must be maintained showing personal information 
with respect to the recipient and his relationship (if any) to mem-
bers, donors, or trustees of the foundation.118 This result is emin-
ently sound. Individuals, as much as groups, are legitimate objects 
of charity. An indigent, needy, uneducated, or diseased individual 
is one of an unlimited class of persons which in Judaeo-Christian 
society has been traditionally assisted by the kindness and generosity 
of those more fortunate. 
Situations involving a foundation dominated by a single individ-
ual have occasioned the greatest ·controversy and have presented a 
strong appearance of inurement to private benefit. The entertain-
ment industry provides dramatic examples. In The Bob and Dolores 
Hope Charitable Foundation v. District Director of Internal Reve-
nue,m the donor had assigned to the foundation all of his rights in 
his life story. The foundation then entered into publication agree-
ments for the story. It was held that this was not a business activity, 
but rather, that the foundation was simply converting its rights, a 
valuable asset, to cash in order to more easily carry out its exempt 
purpose. Nor was this of substantial benefit to the donor, since 
he was a public figure anyway. But, in Horace Heidt Foundation v. 
United States,115 the Court of Claims found that the donor's foun-
dation had taken over the business of merchandising souvenir pro-
grams that were inspired by the donor's entertainment tours of the 
country. The profits were dedicated to young entertainers located 
by talent scouts and served to furnish them with food and lodging. 
However, because all the beneficiaries were employed by Heidt 
and helped in presenting the Heidt shows, the profits were held to 
have inured to the donor's direct benefit. 
Much the same relationship is often involved between a founda-
tion and a profit corporation where common directorships may or 
may not be involved. In Science and Research Foundation) Inc. v. 
United States,116 a foundation contracted with a corporation, the 
latter agreeing to print and distribute books for the foundation 
and to pay back to it a royalty. The arrangement resulted in con-
112. See 2 CASNER, EsrATE PLANNING 880 n.10 (1961 ed.). 
113. See Rev. Rul. 56-304, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 306 for procedure. 
114. 61-1 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. 1J 9437 (S.D. Cal. 1961). 
115. 145 Ct. Cl. 322, 170 F. Supp. 634 (1959). 
116. 181 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Ill. 1960). 
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siderable profit to the corporation, causing the challenge that the 
foundation was actually subsidizing the corporation. The founda-
tion held no proprietary interest in the corporation. It was held 
that the profits were merely payment for services rendered and 
that, in the area of payment for services, foundations have obliga-
tions common to any other purchaser or contractor. The relation-
ship was not nearly as disinterested, however, in the recent decision 
of Stevens Brothers Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner.111 There the 
four founders were also partners in a contracting firm which, in 
turn, owned two-thirds of the stock of a construction company. The 
latter company needed cash in order to purchase a large construction 
bid bond. The foundation advanced the money in exchange for one-
half of the profits expected from the construction contract plus repay-
ment of the advance. Subsequently, the foundation's advance was 
extended on a like basis to other construction contracts, and ulti-
mately the advance exceeded three-quarters of a million dollars (for 
which interest was deferred). The court held the foundation's re-
sulting profit clearly was not "incidental" to its exempt activities. An 
appreciable amount of its funds had been used in a manner which, 
while beneficial to it financially, also resulted in the rescue of a profit 
corporation at a time when the latter had not been able to get addi-
tional financing (an act of charity, but not consistent with tax exemp-
. ') uon .. 
It is worth noting that, when a tax-exempt organization is found 
to have engaged in one of the section 503 "prohibited transactions," 
it is denied exemption only for taxable years after the year of 
official notification that it has engaged in a prohibited transaction, 
unless it entered into such transaction with the purpose of diverting 
corpus or income from its exempt purpose and such transaction 
involved a substantial part of its corpus or income.118 This rule 
places quite a duty of vigilance on the Service. On the other hand, 
it also recognizes that disinterested donors may be the last to 
discover that the recipient of their gifts has violated the Code; thus, 
it protects the deductibility of their contributions in the year 
made. 
D. Some Observations on Inurement 
Do the above decisions indicate an "appearance of evil" which 
would justify the Patman Report's charges of wrongful inner-dealing 
within foundations and among interested parties? As we have 
117. 39 T.C. 93 (1962), afl'd in part, reu'd in part, 324 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1963). 
118. See !NT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 503(a)(2). 
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seen, nowhere does the Internal Revenue Code prohibit arm's-
length transactions between a donor, his foundation, and the foun-
dation's trustees_. And it is fair to say that, when courts have found 
such dealing to be at less than arm's length, the boom of exemption 
denial has almost always been lowered. But, in many instances, 
courts have judged the ingredients of the situation· too formalisti-
cally, without much regard for very real collusion or identity of 
interest between the parties.119 "Indirect" benefits can often lead in 
indirect ways to redounding direct benefits. This is particularly 
true among foundations that hold controlling stock interests in 
profit corporations. A corporation so controlled is assured of a 
friendly, often accommodating (even at arm's length) major stock-
holder. The foundation, in tum, may contribute to causes, persons, 
or institutions who will not be unfriendly to the commercial inter-
ests of the corporation. An environment is thus created in which 
collusive power, even though unexercised, can exist. Similar poten-
tial exists between the donor and his family-controlled foundation. 
Inner-dealing of this type may remain superficially objective and 
disinterested; yet loan arrangements between the foundation and 
its founder, even at the going interest rate, automatically exclude 
the bidding of commercial banks. And the statutory permission to 
pay reasonable salaries for services actually rendered may lead to 
payments to qualifying family members. We may well ask the ques-
tion so familiar to students of antitrust law and policy-is the 
existence of the power per se evil? 
On the other hand, one should think twice before advocating 
unnecessary chastity between substantial donors and recipient tax-
exempt groups. Despite the power of abuse that inheres in the 
regulations and rules we have just discussed, there is danger in 
penalizing a foundation merely because of its fortuitous (and often 
enviable) connection with a productive and talented donor or 
trustee, or because of the high yield it may receive from securities 
it may hold in a close, controlled corporation. Good as well as bad 
results may derive from such associations. The services a foundation 
receives from or through its founder could be unique and far better 
than those otherwise available to it. This is to say that the rules of 
section 503 should not be tightened too arbitrarily for the sake of 
removing anti-competitive influence; rather, a burden of going 
forward with evidence of justification should be placed on founda-
119. The decision in Huron Clinic Foundation, 212 F. Supp. 84'7 (S.D.S.D. 1962), 
remanded by ll24 F.2d 4ll (8th Cir. 196ll), is an example. 
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tions having inner-dealings with interested parties. In this connec-
tion, it should be noted that questions concerning all six of the pro-
hibited transactions of section 503(c) are asked of all reporting 
foundations on Parts I and II of Treasury Form 990-A (the annual 
information return required of section 50l(c)(3) organizations), 
and positive answers must be explained. It is believed that full 
answers to these questions would go a long way toward satisfying 
Congressman Patman's objections. 
One final point needs mention with respect to inner-dealings of 
charitable inter vivos and testamentary trusts. Often, one finds a 
trust of this type carrying on its exempt purpose in good measure, 
but also paying out part of its net income as an annuity to, or re-
taining the personal services of, a related or interested individual. 
This seemingly nepotic practice is defensible on the basis of the so-
called doctrine of "prior charge." For example, suppose a testamen-
tary charitable trust instrument directs that there be paid an an-
nuity for life to a grandniece of the testator. Such payment is not 
really a "condition" imposed upon the existence of the trust, but 
merely the liquidation of a legacy. In such a situation, payment of 
the necessary sum (out of principal if need be) has been upheld.120 
Likewise, when property is transferred inter vivos to a private 
foundation with a present charge that a life income be paid to a 
designated private individual, quite clearly the foundation receives 
a vested remainder interest which is ascertainable, capable of valua-
tion, and in all respects immune from any charge that favoritism or 
inner-dealing is the motive.121 Readily distinguishable from these 
situations, of course, would be voluntary private payments by the 
tax-exempt organization when there is no prior charge. It has been 
suggested that segregation of the necessary assets within the trust or 
foundation will prevent a prior or present charge from being chal-
lenged.122 This doctrine of segregation was extended in an interesting 
way by the Court of Claims in Wells b Wade, Inc. v. United States.128 
By their wills, a donor and his wife provided that their stock in two 
operating, profit corporations would go to a foundation. Upon the 
death of the donor, one of his co-executors borrowed a large sum 
of money from a bank in order to pay the estate administration 
expenses. In response to the bank's demand for security, the foun-
120. T,llese were the facts and holding in Eugene S. Lewis v. United States, 189 F. 
Supp. 950 (D. Wyo. 1961). 
121. Wm. L. Powell Foundation v. Comm'r, 222 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1955), reversing 
21 T.C. 279 (1954). 
122. Wm. L. Powell Foundation v. Comm'r, supra note 121, at 74. 
123. 150 Ct. Cl. 819, 280 F.2d 825 (1960). 
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dation executed an indemnity contract. Although there was no prior 
charge placed on the foundation by the donor's will, the court in 
effect excused allegations of inner-dealing by holding that, since 
the foundation was the residuary legatee of the estate, it was justified 
in guaranteeing the loan rather than risking the sale of some of 
the estate corpus to satisfy it.124 The loan could later be repaid out 
of the operating profits of the two corporations. 
IV. AccuMULATIONS 
A. The Problem 
Congressman Patman indicts foundations for another kind of prac-
tice that is even more obscure to the observer than the inner-dealing 
we have just discussed. This is the accumulation of funds from unex-
pended income by a tax-exempt organization-a state of affairs which 
can be detected only by an x-ray of the foundation's balance sheet. The 
534 foundations studied by the Patman Committee held over 900 mil-
lion dollars in accumulated income at the end of 1960.125 According to 
the Report, they paid out only fifty per cent of their aggregate re-
ceipts during 1951-1960.126 The writer would agree that even a 
casual survey of Schedule 6 of the Report shows many foundations 
have accumulated income to the extent of one-third to three-
quarters of their 1960 net worth (based on market value, not cost). To 
some extent these figures evidencing accumulation are the result 
of a static, rather than a dynamic, look at foundation balance sheets. 
Obviously, the click of a camera shutter will catch some foundations 
with money in the till, whereas a running three-to-four-year time 
exposure might disclose that the funds were later paid out and even 
that indebtedness was incurred. Another distortion in the Patman 
Report is that, oddly, all capital gains are classified as additions to 
income.127 Apparently this was done without regard for the dictates 
of state laws, trust instruments, sound accounting practice, and, as 
we will soon see, the Internal Revenue Code itself, all of which 
generally classify such gains as accretions to ·capital or principal. If 
capital gains are added to net income, it is easy to see how some of 
the most scrupulous organizations would show accumulations. 
It is safe to assume that many foundations have been and are 
124. The Court of Claims relied on an earlier decision which allowed a charitable 
corporation to pay off its debts before making any gifts. See Knapp Bros. Shoe Mfg. 
Corp. v. United States, 135 Ct. CI. 797, 142 F. Supp. 899 (1956). 
125. REPORT 4. 
126. Id. at 51. 
127. The REPORT expressly so states at 6. 
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accumulating true income-rents, interest, dividends, and fees and 
charges. However, legal measures are already available to the 
Internal Revenue Service that empower it to force out of these 
entities funds destined for charitable, educational, religious, or 
other exempt uses. Also, under certain circumstances, foundations 
are legally justified in accumulating income. 
B. Governing Statutory Provisions 
Section 504 of the Internal Revenue Code (also a part of the 
Revenue Act of 1950) deals exclusively with accumulations.128 The 
restrictions of section 504, as well as the prohibited transactions of 
section 503, are in addition to and not in limitation of the restric-
tions contained in section 50l(c)(3). To paraphrase the statutory 
language, section 504 provides that exemption shall be denied for 
the taxable year if the amounts the tax-exempt organization has 
accumulated during that year "and not actually paid out" by the 
end of the taxable year are: 
1. Unreasonable in amount or duration in order to carry 
out the exempt purposes of the organization, or 
2. Used to a substantial degree for purposes other than its 
exempt purpose, or 
3. Invested in such a manner as to jeopardize the carrying 
out of the exempt purpose. 
Section 642(c) and section 68l(c) contain slightly different language. 
They govern the deduction from income allowable to certain 
trusts that make charitable contributions. In section 642(c) it is 
provided that any part of the gross income that, by the terms of 
the governing trust instrument, is "paid or permanently set aside" 
for an exempt purpose during the taxable year is allowable to the 
trust as a deduction. Section 68l(c) adds that, if these amounts 
"paid or permanently set aside" are of the same nature as the three 
prohibited categories above, the amount otherwise allowable to 
the trust as a deduction shall be limited to the amount actually 
paid out and shall not exceed 20 per cent of taxable income, com-
puted without any charitable contributions deduction. The addi-
tion of the language "or permanently set aside" in these sections 
gives greater leeway to permissible accumulations by trusts than is 
given to private foundations. The reason for the added liberality 
would seem to be to allow a donor through a trust instrument, 
whether testamentary or inter vivos, to express a charitable intent 
128. See also INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 68l(c)(2) for limits on charitable contributions 
in instances of unreasonable accumulations of certain trusts. 
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that funds be "set aside" to accumulate for a major goal or end 
which, at the time of the trust's creation, is not attainable because 
of limited assets. Trusts, it seems, may even contain mandatory ac-
cumulation provisions, provided they point to a specific charitable 
project.129 
The regulations, by excluding most capital gains, define the term 
"accumulated income" in a manner different from the Patman 
Report. The regulations state: 
"For the purpose of section 504, the term 'income' means 
gains, profits, and income determined under principles applic-
able in determining the earnings or profits of a corporation. 
The amount accumulated out of income during the taxable 
year or any prior taxable year shall be determined under the 
principles applicable in determining the accumulated earnings 
or profits of a corporation. In determining the reasonableness 
of an accumulation out of income, there will be disregarded 
the following: 
"(I) The accumulation of gain upon the sale or exchange 
of a donated asset to the extent that such gain represents the 
excess of the fair market value of such asset when acquired by 
the organization over its substituted basis in the hands of the 
organization. 
"(2) The accumulation of gain upon the sale or exchange 
of property held for the production of investment income, such 
as dividends, interest, and rents, where the proceeds of such 
sale or exchange are within a reasonable time reinvested in 
property acquired or held in good faith for the production of 
investment income."130 
Had these standards been applied to the statistical summary of the 
Report, the problem of foundation accumulations would have been 
considerably ameliorated. 
Another criticism made by the Patman Report in this area is 
that foundations are substantial stock traders. During the period 
of the sharp market break in 1962, thirty-eight foundations mar-
keted 146 million dollars worth of securities.131 If the suggestion 
from these statistics is that some foundations are speculators, the 
criticism is valid. This is obviously a practice which can become 
(and has been ruled to be) a primary, nonexempt purpose.132 Were 
foundations and charitable trusts not to exchange securities from 
time to time, however, one could suppose that they would be open 
129. A good illustration of this exact point is Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 
F.2d 151 (!ld Cir. 1963), discussed in text accompanying note 142 infra. 
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.504-l(c) (1958). (Emphasis added.) 
131. REPORT 129. 
132. See Randall Foundation v. Riddell, 244 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1957). 
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to the equally valid criticisms that they were keeping income-pro-
ducing property from the market place and thaf the ends of charity 
were suffering from the failure of foundations to upgrade their 
holdings. The imposition of new legal restrictions on such trading 
could conceivably do more overall harm than good by freezing 
foundation holdings and totally blocking their activity during 
market swings. 
C. Illuminating Cases 
No one case found in the writer's research has proved more 
illuminating on the subject of unreasonable foundation accumula-
tions of income than Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United 
States.133 There a foundation was established with a two per cent 
holding of stock in a large corporation of which the donor was 
chairman. The foundation's trustees wanted to build and donate 
a medical research building estimated to cost five hundred thousand 
dollars, a sum far in excess of the foundation's income resources at the 
time. In order to build up its annual return, the foundation, aided 
by interest-free loans from its creator, bought second and third 
mortgages and even some construction mortgages. During the 
time of this build-up, the foundation made small annual gifts, 
but the bulk of its income was accumulated and invested for the 
trustees' main objective. The Commissioner challenged the whole 
program on the basis of the accumulations rule, adding that the 
borrowing by the foundation was not a permissible "reinvestment" 
of income under the applicable regulations.m 
The court found that the accumulation was reasonable and that 
the foundation's borrowing of money to build up its income-pro-
ducing assets was tantamount to a "reinvestment in property 
acquired and held in good faith for the production of investment 
income" under the regulations. The true test of reasonableness, the 
court added, is this: "Does the charitable organization have a con-
crete program for the accumulation of income which will be de-
voted to a charitable purpose and in the light of existing circum-
stances is the program a reasonable one?"135 Answers to these search-
ing questions were found in the purpose of the accumulation, the 
ultimate dollar goal, the funds available at the beginning, the like-
lihood of new funds becoming available from contributions, and 
the extent of time required to reach the goal. As to the latter, the 
court indicated that under proper circumstances a six, seven, or 
133. 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956). 
134. Treas. Reg. § l.504-l(c)(2) (1958). 
135. 144 F. Supp. 74, 92 (D.N.J. 1956). 
November 1964] Patman Report 129 
even an eight-year accumulation period could be reasonable. The 
court also held that the choice of second and third mortgages as an 
investment medium did not come within the prohibitions of sec-
tion 504(a)(3) as an investment likely to jeopardize the foundation 
of the organization. Private foundations, in the absence of con-
trary charter provisions, are not held to trust fund investment stand-
ards. What is unusual about the case is that the court approved of the 
foundation borrowing money in order to add to the corpus more stock 
in the same corporation. At the time of this borrowing, the foun-
dation had a net worth of 110 thousand dollars. It borrowed funds 
from the donor and a bank to acquire 55 thousand shares at a time 
when the market for one unit was twenty to twenty-one dollars. 
Even though a decline in market price of three dollars would liter-
ally have wiped out the foundation, the court accepted as a satis-
factory ground the donor's testimony that he, as chairman of the 
corporation, was sure at the time of the investment that the stock 
would not decline. 
A similar holding is found in a 1962 decision by another district 
court.186 There, the principals of the foundation were also the 
principals of a company that had advanced and loaned money to 
the foundation. When the net worth of the foundation grew to 
almost four million dollars, the trustees determined to repay the 
outstanding loans before embarking on the ultimate purpose of 
the foundation-the construction and endowment of a civic build-
ing for Terre Haute, Indiana. The donor's family neither received 
loans from the foundation nor collected interest on loans advanced; 
the objective of the family was to "beef up" the foundation's finan-
cial ability to construct the civic building. Not surprisingly, the 
Commissioner again argued that the retiring of indebtedness incurred 
in the acquisition of property is the equivalent of accumulating 
income.187 But again, it was held that the accumulation was reason-
able in view of the foundation's specific goal. To what extent this 
holding stemmed from the testimony of foundation officials at trial, 
rather than from the foundation's charter purposes, is not made 
clear in the opinion of the court. It is submitted that the charter 
purposes would provide a far more unimpeachable source than 
advised courtroom testimony rendered after the fact. 
Another instance of this permitted "bootstrapping" is found in 
Commissioner v. Leon A. Beeghly Fund,188 a·case dealing with the 
136. Hulman Foundation v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Ind. 1962). 
137. The Commissioner cited Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 CUM, BuLL. 128. 
138. 310 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1962), affirming 35 T.C. 490 (1960). 
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accumulation standards applicable to charitable trusts. There, the 
court stated: "[T] he use of any such (foundation) income to pay 
for the assets which produced it or to pay for other assets which 
will produce more income would, under the terms of the trust 
agreement, be used exclusively for charitable purposes at some 
time."139 The Beeghly rationale would seem particularly well adapted 
to trusts since, as we have seen, gifts to such entities are deductible 
if their income is paid or "permanently set aside" for exempt 
purposes.140 
The standards that were applied in the Friedland decision pro-
duced an opposite result in a very recent decision of the Third Cir-
cuit, Erie Endowment v. United States.141 The court there observed: 
"[Erie Endowment] has no natural right to tax exemption, 
but rather a Congressional balm granted because losses in tax 
revenues were deemed compensated for by the value of its char-
itable work. Absent a sufficient amount of charitable work com-
mensurate with the total amount of Erie's available charitable 
funds, exempt status must cease or, in fact, never come into 
existence."142 
The court found that, by mandatory accumulation provisions con-
tained in its charter, the Erie Endowment trust had reached the 
point in 1958 where its net income was twenty-six thousand dollars 
and its accumulated income was 390 thousand dollars. Even con-
sidering the language of direction in the trust instrument, this ac-
cumulation was felt to be too flagrant to justify honoring the donor's 
vague desire to do something "very substantial."143 
"The standard to be applied is whether the taxpayer can 
justify the total accumulation of income at the end of the tax-
able year, in terms of both time and amount, on the basis of a 
rational to~al program of charitable intent."144 
The court concluded that by this standard the trustees had been 
given no program of expenditures nor any specific projects that 
would justify the accumulation. The trust was judicially reminded 
that its program must be prospective in direction and not occur 
expeditiously to the organization "after the Commissioner's shadow 
becomes visible."145 
139. 310 F.2d 756, 761 (6th Cir. 1962). 
140. For a holding almost as liberal with respect to private foundations, see A. 
Shiffman v. Comm'r, 32 T.C, 1073 (1959). 
141. 316 F.2d 151 (3d Cir: 1963), affirming, 202 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1961). 
142. 316 F.2d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1963). 
143. Id. at 155. 
144. Ibid. 
145. Ibid. 
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D. Some Conclusions on Accumulations 
Foundations should not be required to spend their income as 
fast as they receive it, even in the absence of a specific and rational 
total program of charitable intent. The measure of the accumula-
tion is, of course, the income of the taxable year and all prior years 
that is not paid out.146 It would be surprising if an organization 
were directed to find use for all income in the very year of its 
receipt. Even functional charities are seldom put to such a rigorous 
standard. It is submitted that the regulations governing this• aspect 
of foundation activity presuppose an intelligent, searching place-
ment of foundation funds among the many possible charitable 
recipients. One of the natural advantages of a private foundation 
is that it may serve as a reservoir from which donations can be made 
with more care and investigation than is the case with the typically 
hurried and unsystematic giving that characterizes the month of 
December for many individual donors. One thing that the Patman 
Report does not strongly criticize is the worth and value of founda-
tion gifts once they are made or committed. Placing foundation 
giving on too fast a racetrack could result in just this criticism, 
however, and would strike at the very raison d'etre of foundations 
as instrumentalities of charitable support.147 
V. THE PATMAN REPORT'S RECOMMENDATIONS 
Congressman Patman proposes certain remedies for the list of 
abuses his report cites. Particularly pertinent to the content of this 
article are the following recommendations of the report: 
I. Limitation of twenty-five years on the life of foundations; 
2. Prohibition of foundations from engaging in business 
either directly or indirectly; 
3. Prohibition of any commercial money lending or borrow-
ing by foundations; 
4. Prohibition of foundation grants to employees of any 
company the foundation controls through stock ownership; 
5. Limitation of foundation stockholdings to not more than 
three per cent of the stock of any one company, and prohibition 
of the right to vote stock; 
6. Stricter regulation of foundation holdings and invest-
ments. In this connection the Report states: "Our study shows 
sizable stock market losses for a number of foundations during 
146. 6 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34.17 (1957 ed.). 
147. The reader is referred to the following revenue rulings on the scope of per-
missible foundation accumulation of income: Rev. Rul. 54-137, 1954-1 CuM. BuLL. 289; 
Rev. Rul. 54-227, 1954-1 CUM. Buu.. 291; Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 128; 
Rev. Rul. 55-674, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 264. 
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the ten-year period of 1951 through 1960. Did the directors or 
trustees reimburse those foundations for such losses? I believe 
that the answer would be negative."148 
7. Taxation of income derived from assets acquired by 
foundation borrowing; 
8. Denial of charitable deduction for any amount given by 
a contributor to a foundation he controls unless and until the 
foundation puts the contributed money or property to direct 
charitable use; 
9. Elimination of the "tax profit" on gifts of appreciated 
property to foundations; 
10. For purposes of figuring the accumulation of income, 
all contributions to a foundation and all capital gains from its 
operations should be classed as "income"; 
11. Amounts unreasonably accumulated in private corpora-
tions should be added to the accumulation of any foundation 
that holds a controlling amount of stock in the corporation, 
and corporations controlled by foundations should be subject 
to the unreasonable accumulation earnings tax of section 531 
of the Code; 
12. A regulatory agency for the supervision of tax-exempt 
foundations should be considered149 
The Report contains other recommendations that deal with gift 
and estate taxes, notably the suggestion that gifts to foundations 
should not be deductible from the taxable estates of decedents.150 
Finally, the concluding chapter of the Report summarily criticizes 
lax enforcement procedures of the Treasury Department. By re-
peating a series of questions propounded by Congressman Patman 
to the Commission.er of Internal Revenue, 151 the Report seeks to 
show that the Internal Revenue Service has no formal procedure 
for public challenge of the exempt status of an organization, that 
there are no personal penalties against trustees of foundations that 
engage in prohibited transactions, that no specific time is given a 
foundation in which to distribute each year's income (subject, of 
course, to the rules of section 504), and that there is no prohibition 
against family members staffing, and being compensated by, family 
foundations. Of course, none of these lapses is due to a lack of 
enforcement; there are simply no regulations that would have al-
lowed more definite answers by the Commissioner to the questions. 
The work of the Committee is not finished. In a cnapter entitled 
148. See REPORT 133. 
149. For an extended discussion of these recommendations, see the excellent com• 
ment, Krasnowiecki 8: Brodsky, Comment on the Patman Report, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 
190 (1963). 
150. REPORT 134, 
151. Id. at 73-74. 
November 1964] Patman Report 133 
"Unfinished Business," Congressman Patman promised further in-
vestigation of stock sales and stock trading by foundations, of founda-
tion credit arrangements in the purchase of securities, of a possible 
conflict of interest between an individual's advisory role as a founda-
tion trustee and his personal business interests, and further analysis 
of foundation expenditures-including administrative and operat-
ing expenses.152 In fact, as a harbinger of investigations and reports 
yet to come, a questionnaire letter has recently Qanuary 1964) been 
sent out by the Committee asking foundation trustees for their views 
on the several subjects covered by the first installment of the Report. 
As this paper is being written, there is evidence that the Patman 
Committee is already following through on some of the investiga-
tions it earlier promised. Its Report has stirred the Senate Finance 
Committee to request from Treasury Secretary Dillon a "study of 
possible abuses of private foundations under internal revenue 
laws."158 And, testifying before the Committee on July 21, 1964, 
during the first of its public hearings, Secretary Dillon made it clear 
that he will offer recommendations at the end of the year or in 
early 1965, concerning "self-dealing between a contributor and the 
foundation he controls" and the competitive effects of foundation-
controlled corporations on tax-paying companies.154 To Congress-
man Patman's repeated questions as to whether foundations are 
eroding the tax base, however, the Treasury Secretary answered 
"that even massive contributions to foundations generally support 
worthy causes which, absent such tax-exempt groups, would have 
to be either abandoned or taken over by federal and state govern-
ments. "ills 
Congressman Patman has also continued his charge that the 
Internal Revenue Service has been extremely lax in the enforcement 
of regulations governing foundations. According to Committee al-
legations, the Service was "lethargic" in auditing the returns of a 
large New York foundation because it assessed the foundation for 
only 1952 and 1953 taxes even though the challenged practices 
continued afterwards and the matter was not settled until 1963. 
Appearing before the Committee on July 22, 1964, Mortimer Caplin, 
then the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, declared 
that all 534 of the foundations studied by the Patman Committee 
have undergone audits, and the tax exemptions of eight have been 
152. Id. at 130-131. 
153. Wall St. J., July 17, 1964, p. 3, col. 2. 
154. Id., July 22, 1964, p. 3, col. 2. 
155. Ibid. 
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revoked.11i6 Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service, he said, has 
established an Exempt Organizations Council to "eliminate admin-
istrative obstacles."157 The Commissioner at the same time added to 
Congressman Patman's recommendations by promising that his de-
partment would propose legislation to prohibit donor-foundation 
transactions, to require foundations to give all their assets to charity 
and go out of business within twenty-five years after organization, to 
place a limit on the amount of stock one foundation may hold in a 
single company, and to put r~strictions on speculative stock market 
transactions.158 
VI. A SUMMING UP 
It is easily seen that some of the Patman Report's recommenda-
tions are wholly arbitrary. Clearly in this category are the recom-
mendations limiting to three per cent the amount of stock a founda-
tion may hold in any one corporation and compelling complete 
distribution of all assets at the end of twenty-five years of existence. 
Also, it has recently been remarked that such supposed reforms would 
be much too sweeping for the evil they are designed to curb-namely, 
the undesirable impact of tax-exempt foundations on our market 
economy.159 
Up until now, we have skirted a real policy issue: whether 
private funds and foundations should be permitted to continue to 
exist side by side with schools, hospitals, churches, and other func-
tional charities. The Patman Report is not a criticism ,of charitable 
ends. Its attack is against the device by which, in the name of those 
ends, taxpayers establish a reservoir of tax-free income which then 
travels an often delayed, tortuous route before emerging in the 
hands of the operating donees. The Report presumes, too unfairly, 
that in many such organizations the motive of tax avoidance pre-
dominates over the motives of good will and good works. Indeed, in 
sections of the Report this presumption is so overtly cynical that it 
tends to undermine and discredit many sincere suggestions which 
it contains. Consider, for example, the attack on a famous chemical 
fortune destined for a family foundation: 
"Once again, the 'cream' from one of our nation's great 
fortunes will go completely tax free. Once again, the 'skim milk' 
incomes of the hardworking majority of the American people 
156. Id., July 23, 1964, p. 2, col. 3. 
157. Ibid. 
158. Ibid. 
159. K.rasnowiecki &: Brodsky, supra note 149, at 195. 
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will be forced to bear a still heavier share of the total tax 
burden .... 
"Only after (the founder's) death ... will the tax exempt ... 
Foundation come into full flower. Then it will receive each 
year nearly all the income from the family estate's vast empire 
of banking, industry, railroads and real estate-and that income 
will wholly escape income tax.es."160 
This is not so much an attack on foundations as it is a cavalier 
criticism of tax avoidance th~ough donation to charity. It suggests 
that charity should no longer be a private concern, that it should 
no longer offer an alternative to the payment of income tax.es, and 
that only the federal government could fairly operate in this field-
suggestions beyond the original investigative mission of the Com-
mittee. This type of thinking adversely affects the more constructive 
parts of the Report. 
We have already suggested that a main purpose of private 
foundations is to "systematize" charitable giving by providing an 
entity that will outlive the donor or creator and prolong an other-
wise ephemeral scheme of donation. The availability of a private 
foundation also tends to speed charitable giving prior to death and 
avoids the inevitable delays attending a testamentary disposition of 
the same funds. That a donor or creator often chooses his family 
members to fill trusteeships initially is not ipso facto evidence of 
nepotism or bad faith. Nor is the bare fact that there is put into 
the created foundation large amounts of stock in a single company 
at all inimical to a charitable purpose. Often, a single block of 
securities is all a donor has to contribute. Indeed, Congressman 
Patman contradicts himself by simultaneously criticizing founda-
tions for retaining large blocks of stock and complaining about the 
market volume of trading and exchange in which they allegedly 
indulge. It is submitted that, unless foundations are to be outlawed 
altogether, leaving nothing but operating charities, the personnel of 
their boards and the securities of their portfolios are a secondary 
consideration, deserving certainly of scrutiny but not of wholesale 
reform. 
Perhaps Congress will ultimately place foundations under stand-
ards of trust and requirements of operation akin to those applied to 
banks and life insurance companies. In fact, the Report suggests 
that, if foundations were treated "the way the tax law now does 
trusts," a donor would be denied a charitable deduction for amounts 
160. CHAIRMAN OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITI'EE ON SMALL BUSINESS, 88th Cong., 2d 
SC!S., TAX•ExEMPl' FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRusrs: THEIR IMPAcr ON OUR EcoNOMY 
(Comm. Print 1964). 
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he contributes to his controlled foundation until such time as the 
foundation actually uses the money for charity.161 Similarly, income 
earned by the foundation would be taxable to the controlling donor 
until expended for one of the foundation's charitable purposes. 
However, this suggestion would be impossible to implement without 
rewriting the sections of the Code that deal with the taxability of 
creators of private trusts.162 
The Patman Report's criticism of 'the business and commercial 
activities of foundations as well as their accumulated, undonated 
income is more on point. The second concluding recommendation 
of the Report states that "tax exempt foundations should be pro-
hibited from engaging in business directly or indirectly."16s This 
article has cited abuses, both in the area of foundation competition 
with profit enterprises and in the area of foundation accumulation 
of income. In the first area, as present deterrents we have the "op-
erational" test and the tax on unrelated business income. The 
difficulty, however, is that a large foundation may be operated 
primarily for eleemosynary purposes and yet engage in a relatively 
small activity which touches the area of competition of small busi-
nesses. It is submitted that more "relation" should be required of 
such so-called "unrelated" business activities. In other words, a 
qualitative test should be added to the present quantitative stand-
ards of the "operational" test. Such a test would require that founda-
tions not only be operated primarily for their exempt purpose in 
order to maintain tax-free status, but also that any business income 
(i.e., income earned from active, not passive, sources) be "related" 
to the accomplishment or furtherance of the charter purposes. Under 
this suggested test, "unrelated" business income would be taxed, and 
its receipt would become the equivalent of a prohibited transaction, 
resulting in loss of exemption. The latter result, or the threat of it, 
would constitute a far greater deterrent than the present subjection 
of unrelated activities to tax. Concurrent with such a revision should 
also come a closing of the "subsidiary loophole." As was earlier 
pointed out,164 outright foundation ownership of a separately in-
corporated business subsidiary provides an escape from the prohibited 
transaction rules. This device also permits the business subsidiary 
161. REPORT 133-34. 
162. Specifically INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, §§ 673(a) (b), 676-778. 
163. Emphasis added. Congressman Patman explained the word "indirectly" by 
stating: "Foundations controlling corporations engaged in business, through the extent 
of stock ownership in those corporations, should themselves be deemed to be engaged 
in that business." See Krasnowiecki & Brodsky, supra note 149, at 193. 
164. See text accompanying note S5 supra. 
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to accumulate earned income free of the section 531 accumulated 
earnings tax since no motive of avoiding income tax can be attrib-
uted to a shareholder who is tax-exempt. 
A third reform should be the tightening up of rules relating to 
accumulated income. The longer the route between donation of 
funds to a foundation and their application by the foundation to 
functional, charitable ends, the less reason the American tax.paying 
public has for granting tax shelter to those funds. It is difficult to 
formulate a proper policy here. While the initial bootstrapping of 
foundation assets by borrowing and then accumulating funds to 
retire the indebtedness is susceptible to abuse, the alternative would 
be for a donor to incur a personal indebtedness and acquire the 
property before establishing the foundation. But, this alternative 
would require the loan to be amortized with tax.able income. One 
can make a good case for the proposition that the ends of charity 
are better served by permitting the nontaxed foundation to do the 
borrowing. One approach to this problem could be a strict applica-
tion of the Samuel Friedland Foundation doctrine.165 Foundations 
could be made to justify accumulations of more than, for example, 
two years' duration by "statements of intent" filed with their annual 
information returns (Form 990-A), a practice which is presently 
pursued by circumspect foundations. Rather than merely listing 
their year-beginning and year-ending aggregate accumulation as is 
now required by the return, foundations should be required to state 
the specific purpose of the accumulation and its intended duration 
in years. Any changes in the accumulated fund should be footnoted 
and explained. If this practice were followed, accumulations could 
be checked annually, and their purpose enforced, by the Internal 
Revenue Service. A change in the purpose of the accumulation, as 
well as an extension of its term, should require Internal Revenue 
Service approval. 
In connection with accumulations, it should also be noted that 
private foundations-and those usually accumulating funds for at 
least one year or more-lost a point to publicly-supported founda-
tions under the Revenue Act of 1964.166 A new statutory distinction 
between the two types of exempt groups was there created which 
may emphasize to private foundations the importance of making 
speedier charitable application of their income. The law opened 
wider the category of charitable and educational gifts that qualify 
for the additional ten per cent (total of thirty per cent) charitable 
165. 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956), and see earlier discussion of case. 
166. See P.L. 88•272, 26 U.S.C.A. § 170 (1964). 
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deduction by including, inter alia, gifts made to publicly-financed 
foundations.167 The House Committee on Ways and Means ex-
plained why the enlarged deduction was not being extended to 
private foundations: 
"Your committee is limiting the additional 10-percent de-
duction to organizations which are publicly or governmentally 
supported, however, and is not making this additional deduc-
tion available in the case of private foundations. These latter 
types of organizations frequently do not make contributions to 
the operating philanthropic organizations for extended periods 
of time and in the meanwhile use the funds for investments. 
The extra IO-percent deduction is intended to encourage im-
mediately spendable receipts of contributions for charitable 
organitations."168 
Still another distinction drawn by the 1964 Act will undoubtedly 
have a cathartic effect on private foundations, causing them to break 
up and discharge accumulated income. Subsection l 70(g), added to 
the Code in the 1964 Act, restricts the "unlimited charitable contribu-
tions deduction" to gifts made to publicly supported organizations 
(those eligible for the thirty per cent limitation) and to certain 
"operating" private foundations. The latter are elaborately defined, 
and contributions to them will qualify for the unlimited deduction 
only if such private foundation, 
1. Not later than the close of the third year after the taxable 
year in which the foundation receives the contribution, 
expends an amount equal to at least fifty percent of such 
contribution for: 
(a) Active conduct of its charter purposes; 
(b) Assets that are directly devoted to such active 
conduct; 
(c) Contributions to other qualifying organizations, or 
( d) Any combination of the above; 
and 
2. For said three-year period or less, expends all of its net 
income (determined without regard to capital gains or losses) 
for the purposes described above.169 
Private foundations that expect to receive charitable contributions 
from donors who seek to qualify under and stay within the "un-
limited charitable contributions deduction" benefits will have to 
meet these strict terms. Section l 70(g) is of further interest since it 
167. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b){l)(A){vi) (1964). 
168. REPORT OF TiiE COMMITI'EE ON WAYS AND MEANS TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 8363, 
H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1963). (Emphasis added.) 
169. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(g)(3) (1964). 
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may be a harbinger of future regulations. The three-year accumula-
tions period could conceivably turn into a general rule of qualifica-
tion for income tax-exemption of funds and foundations. 
Nothing has been suggested here with respect to inner-dealing 
within and among foundations, their creators, and their trustees. 
Changes in this facet of foundation regulation may evolve in the 
next few years as a result of rules recently enacted with respect to 
self-employed individuals' retirement trusts. In the Self-Employed 
Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, owner-employees who 
"control'' the trade or business with respect to which the retirement 
plan is established are barred from engaging in any transaction with 
their own retirement trusts.17° The act absolutely prohibits certain 
other transactions of the trusts, such as the lending of funds for any 
reason whatsoever, the paying of any compensation for personal 
services rendered, the making available of any services on a prefer-
ential basis, and the sale to or purchase from the trust of any assets. 
Whether these strict regulations will, by affinity, "rub off" on the 
more liberal private foundation requirements is uncertain; but the 
Patman Committee cannot be presumed to be unaware of this most 
recent parallel. 
Of course, increased regulation by the several states would also 
be 'a corrective measure. A few states have passed the Uniform Super-
vision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act.171 Although the act 
does not apply to charitable corporations that are organized and 
operated primarily for educational, religious, or hospital purposes, 
it states with respect to charitable trusts: "It is hereby declared to 
be the policy of the state that the people of the state are interested 
in the administration, operation and disposition of the assets of all 
charitable trusts in the state .... "172 The state attorney general is 
directed to maintain a register of trusts and trustees, trust instru-
ments and inventories of trust assets must be filed, and sworn testi-
mony from trustees may be required and documents subpoenaed. 
The stated purpose behind all of this is to ascertain whether the 
trusts "are being properly administered.''173 This legislation, even 
though requiring duplicate report filing and the consequent added 
paper work, tends to enforce upon charitable trusts an adherence 
to their stated purposes. Its thrust is more specific, more direct, and 
170. Now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 503(j). 
171. See, e.g., Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 14.251-.266 (Supp. 1961); California: 
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12580-96 (1963); Oregon: Ore. Laws 1963, ch. 583, pp. 1186-91 
(1963). 
172. MICH. COMP. LAws § 14.251 (Supp. 1961). 
173. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 14.256(b) (Supp. 1961). 
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more germane to charitable purposes and their execution than are 
many of the more ponderous recommendations of the Patman 
Report. 
On balance, it is clear that Congressman Patman has initiated 
a debate that will continue for years, until either the excesses of 
some foundations are curbed voluntarily or the penalty of remedial 
legislation is suffered by all. If the writer has appeared critical of the 
Report, it is mainly because the Report tends toward negative and 
alarmist comment, rather than constructive suggestion. Little is said 
about the hundreds of private funds and charitable trusts and cor-
porations that hew to the line, word, and letter of the regulations 
and whose charitable goals relieve the taxpayer of the less econom-
ical, and indeed questionable, administration of charity by the 
federal government. By highlighting the salient points of the Report 
against the background of existing laws and regulations, the writer 
has attempted to offer the opportunity of judgment to the reader. 
It is hoped that the final verdict on the future of tax-exempt organ-
izations will not be reached until a carefully-made record has been 
presented to, and digested by, the American taxpayer. In the mean-
time, foundations will have to weather, as best they can, the close 
scrutiny that today attends tax exemption of major portions of the 
nation's wealth. 
